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The cases holding that a foreseeable intervening criminal act will
not relieve a negligent party of liability are not always clear as to
what conditions make a criminal act foreseeable. Terms such as "likely"
and "probable" are frequently used. Perhaps the best guide is to be
found in comment b of section 448 of the Restatement of Torts, which
states that an intervening criminal act will be considered foreseeable
and not a superseding cause if the defendant's negligent conduct
creates: (i) a situation "affording temptations to which a recognizable
percentage of humanity is likely to yield;" or (2) a situation where
"persons of peculiarly vicious type are likely to be."
In the principal case the Alabama Supreme Court quoted this
section and correctly applied it to the facts to find that the defendants'
acts were the proximate cause of the plantiff's injury. "They created
a situation of a kind which this court and others have consistently said
affords a temptation to a recognizable percentage of humanity to com-
mit murder." 30 The court then quoted an earlier Alabama case which
had held that a wager policy is illegal because the holder has a pecuni-
ary interest in the death of the insured which opens "'a wide door by
which a constant temptation is created to commit for profit the most
atrocious of crimes."' (Emphasis added.)3 1
GEORGE H. FRAuN, JR.
ATTENDANCE OF OUT-OF-STATE WITNESSES
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS*
The effort to compel the attendance of out-of-state witnesses in
criminal proceedings received a serious set-back when the Supreme
Court of Florida, in the case of In re O'Neill,1 invalidated that state's
act, which was the uniform act on the subject. The court based its de-
cision primarily on the ground that the right of free ingress and egress
between the states, as guaranteed by the privileges and immunities
0sioo So. 2d at 711.
slid. at 7o8, citing Helmetag's Adm'x v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183, 187 (t884). (Em-
phasis added.)
*Ed. Note: The following case comment discusses the decision of the Florida
Supreme Court in the case of In re O'Neill, ioo So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1958). After this com-
ment was written, the United States Supreme Court in the case of New York v. O'Neill,
27 U.SJ.. Week 4189 (U.S. March 2, 1959), reversed the decision of the Florida
Supreme Court. Justice Frankfurter delivered the majority opinion of the Court.
Justices Douglas and Black dissented,
11oo So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1958), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 8o3 (1958).
CASE COMMENTS
clauses of the federal constitution, had been violated by the uniform
act.2 The court also discussed the possibility that the act gave extra-
territorial jurisdiction to Florida's courts and questioned the power
of a Florida court to enforce an order for a witness to appear before
a court of another state.
In 1936 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Bar Association recommended to the
states the adoption of a Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Wit-
nesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings.3 A total of
forty-three states and territories have adopted either the uniform act
itself or similar legislation.4 The uniform act, adopted by Florida in
1941,r provides that a judge of any state having a similar law may
initiate a demand for a witness by filing a certificate under seal in
any court of the state in which the witness is present.6 The certifi-
cate must show that a criminal proceeding is pending in the de-
manding state, that the person sought is a material witness in such a
proceeding, and that his presence is necessary for the furtherance of
justice. A judge of the court in which the certificate has been filed holds
a hearing at which the witness will be required to appear. At the
hearing the judge will consider the following: (i) whether the witness
is necessary to the out-of-state proceeding; (2) whether the witness
will be caused undue hardship by appearing in the out-of-state court;
and (3) whether the demanding state has laws that will protect the
witness from arrest or service of process while attending the out-of-
state proceeding. If the judge decides to compel the witness to testify
in the demanding state, he may do so either by issuing a summons
directing the witness to attend and testify in the demanding out-of-state
court, or by placing the witness in the custody of an officer of the
demanding state.
Recently, the State of New York, following the above-outlined pro-
cedure, filed a certificate in a Florida circuit court.7 The certificate
1 .S. Const. art. IV, § 2; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § i.
'9 U.L.A. 87 (1936).
'Id. at 86.
MF~a. Stat. Ann. § 942.02 (1955).
$Ibid.
The certificate of the Honorable Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Judge of the Court of
General Sessions of the State of New York, was filed in the Circuit Court of Dade
County, Florida, on April 23, 1956. The certificate recited that Judge Schweitzer
had read an affidavit of an Assistant District Attorney of the County of New York
recommending that O'Neill be taken into custody and delivered to an officer of the
State of New York to assure his attendance at a grand jury investigation. ioo So. 2d
at 151.
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requested Florida authorities to require one Joseph C. O'Neill to
attend and testify in a grand jury proceeding in New York County.
The judge's certificate stated that O'Neill was a material witness in
the New York proceeding and recommended that he be taken into
custody and delivered to an officer of the State of New York to as-
sure his attendance before the grand jury. O'Neill was not a resident
of Florida but was temporarily within the state for the purpose of
presiding at a union convention. 8 He was apprehended by the Florida
authorities, gave bond,9 and a month later he filed a response. The
circuit judge, at the hearing to determine the materiality of the witness,
based his opinion upon the record of the case and held the uniform
act unconstitutional.1o
The decision of the circuit court in the O'Neill case was appealed"
by the State of New York. Upon review, the Florida Supreme Court
outlined the manner in which the uniform act would have been
applied to O'Neill if the circuit court judge had found it desirable
to send him to New York under custody. O'Neill, a citizen of Illinois
which had passed no reciprocal witness statute, was in Florida for
only a brief visit. He was brought into court and confronted with an
order placing him in custody of an officer who was to have conducted
him to New York. His privilege of staying or returning to his home
in Illinois, or of going elsewhere, would have been terminated. This,
in the language of the Florida court, was a harsh "infringement of
the right a citizen has to go from place to place which is a privilege...
secured to him under the Fourteenth Amendment."'
2
The uniform act has been judicially attacked on constitutional
wThe New York grand jury was investigating the use of funds in the Distillery,
Rectifying, Wine qnd Allied Workers International *Union of America of which
O'Neill was General President, Chairman of the Executive Board, and Chairman
of the Social Security Department. There is little doubt that O'Neill was a material
and necessary witness in an investigation into the misuse of the funds of this
union.
OIt was noted by the court in the O'Neill case that there was no provision made
for bail in the uniform act. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 942.o2 (1955).
lerhe circuit judge said the statute was unconstitutional because it gave extra-
territorial jurisdiction to the state, impaired the right of ingress and egress, and
made no provision for bail. The judge also thought that O'Neill was not a material
and necessary witness.
"The court held that the proceeding was not criminal and that appeal was the
proper method of review as, Fla. Const. art. V, § 5, the Florida Supreme Court




grounds in other states,13 but Florida is the only state in which the
statute has been declared wholly unconstitutional by a state court of
last resort.14 A situation now exists in which the majority of decis-
ions support the statute, but the most recent decision denounces it.
The court's contention, that O'Neill's right of free ingress and
egress among the states had been impaired, was based upon an unusual
interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of the federal
constitution. 15 The traditional interpretation of this clause is that the
states are enjoined only from discriminating between a citizen of
the United States and a citizen of a particular state.16 When an in-
dividual is within the boundaries of a state, he is amenable to the
laws of that state;' 7 therefore, if a state can curtail the right of its
own citizens to ingress and egress, it can curtail the same right of any
person who is within its boundaries.
The Florida interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause
seems to be that the citizens of each state, no matter in which state
they may find themselves, are to be afforded all the privileges and im-
munities granted by every other state. "Not only are the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States placed beyond the
power of the state to impair but citizens of each state are vouch-
safed the privileges and'immunities of the citizens of all the states."
Therefore, "O'Neill is entitled.., to all the privileges and immunities
of all the citizens of all the other states .... 18 Expressed another way,
the Florida court adopted the theory that a citizen takes with him
when he goes into another state all of the privileges and immunities
granted to him by his native state. Therefore, the court stressed the
fact that O'Neill was a citizen of a state which had not passed a
reciprocal witness statute and argued that his immunity from com-
"Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919); State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505,
221 P.2d 404 (195o); In re Saperstein, 3o N.J. Super. 373, 1o4 A.2d 842, cert. denied,
348 U.S. 874 (1954); In re Cooper, 127 N. J. L. 312, 22 A.2d 532 (1941); New York v.
Parker, 16 N.J. Misc. 319, i A.2d 54 (1936); In re Costello, 279 App. Div. 908, 111
N.Y.S.2d 313 (ist Dep't 1952); Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 798, i3o N.Y.
Supp. 713 (ist Dep't 1911); State v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 264 P.2d 419 (1953). Some of
these cases arose under state statutes prior to the enactment of the uniform act.
21'In New York v. Parker, i6 N.J. Misc. 319, 1 A.2d 54 (1936), the statute was held
inoperative because the objective was not expressed in the title.
"See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
"Madden v. Kentucky, 3o9 U.S. 83 (1940); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1872).
',Douglas v. New York, New Haven and Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929);
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 798,
13o N.Y. Supp. 713 (1st Dep't 1911).
2B1oo So. 2d at 154.
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pulsory attendance at an out-of-state proceeding was brought with
him into Florida.' 9 In other words, O'Neill was especially privileged.
Extending this view of the privileges and immunities clause, if Il-
linois had not passed an act providing for the subpoenaing of witnesses
to attend trial within Illinois, then Florida would have been powerless
to compel O'Neill to attend a trial within Florida. If Florida's courts
really adopted this view of the privileges and immunities clause, they
would be discriminating against their own state citizens in favor of
out-of-state visitors. It must be remembered that the enjoyment of
this privilege of ingress and egress is coincident with the duty of a cit-
izen to aid his government by giving evidence in court.2 0 Every citizen
who attends any trial as a witness or a juryman is deprived, in the
same sense as he is deprived under the uniform act, of the privilege
of leaving the state. The contention of the Florida court seems to be
without merit.
.Closely related to the privileges and immunities issue is the
question of whether the uniform act may be so applied as to deprive
a person of his liberty without due process of law. In the case of
In re Cooper,2' it was held that the uniform act was not unconsti-
tutional as depriving an individual of his liberty without due process
of law. In that case the court said the witness was guaranteed due
process because prerequisite to the issuing of a summons was the re-
quirement that a hearing be held to determine the witness' materiality
and to insure no undue hardship. In Massachusetts v. Klaus,22 the court
said that the statute is no more in violation of the due process clause
for deprivipg a proposed witness of his liberty without due process
than is a statute providing for having a witness subpoenaed to attend
a trial within the state; this law has never been questioned as being
unconstitutional.23 In both of these cases the courts emphasized that
a hearing was guaranteed a witness before a subpoena could be is-
sued and pointed out that this provision of the uniform act really
gave the witness a better guarantee of due process of law than did
the statutes providing that a witness be subpoenaed to attend a trial
within the subpoenaing state. Other courts have recognized that
"he language of the court was as follows: "If ... a citizen of a state having
no such law, Illinois, travels to a state having it, Florida, and there is made subject
to the law because another state, New York, thinks his presence there is 'desirable,'
it cannot be true that the right of all the citizens of all the states to move among
them has not been impaired." Id. at 156.
2DBlair v. United States, 250 US. 273.(i919); 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 717, 721 (1937).
"i127 N.J.L. 312, 22 A.2d 532 (1941).
0145 App. Div. 798, io N.Y. Supp. 713 (ist Dep't 1911).
2s13o N.Y. Supp. at 716.
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the purpose of the statute is to aid, by means of comity between states,
the orderly and effectual administration of justice and the prosecu-
tion of criminal conduct; 24 and implicit in their decisions is the prin-
ciple that due process of law is an historical product and is not to be
turned into a destructive dogma against the states in the administration
of justice.
25
The duty of a citizen to give evidence in court and the power
of a state to compel evidence, subject to the right against self-incrimi-
nation, is a well-established proposition.20 That this duty is not limited
by state boundaries is manifested by the many acts of state legislation
requiring persons to give evidence in the form of depositions for use
in the courts of other states.2 7 Such depositions suffice for civil suits,
but in criminal prosecutions by any state which bases its jurisprudence
on the common law, the defendant is entitled to be confronted with
the witnesses against him. 28 Unless there is power somewhere to compel
a witness to proceed from one state to another to testify, many guilty
persons may escape punishment for their crimes. It is manifest that if
this power of compulsion exists anywhere, it must exist in the state
within which the witness is present and wherein he can be served with
the necessary order or subpoena.
The Florida Supreme Court took a negative approach to the
problem of whether a state legislature can constitutionally grant the
power to state courts to require a person within the state to go into
another state and testify. This approach struck at the fundamental
idea and purpose of reciprocal legislation-i.e., what a state cannot
accomplish acting alone it can accomplish acting in concert with other
states. In invalidating so important an act of legislation, a court should
base its decision firmly on constitutional law. In the O'Neill case
$In re Saperstein, 3o N.J. Super. 373, 104 A.2d 842 (1954); State v. Blount, 200
Ore. 35, 264 P.2d 419 (1953).
'See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952) (dictum). See generally Irvine
v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (t954).
"Blackmer v. United States, 284 U-S. 421 (1932); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S.
135 (1927); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
wIn considering virtually the same problem as that presented by the principal
case, the court in Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 798, 13o N.Y. Supp. 713, 715
(ist Dep't 1911), made the following observations in reference to the alleged un-
lawful extraterritorial effect of the statute: "Nor is the duty to give evidence, or the
power to compel it to be given limited to causes pending in the courts of the
state. Witness our statute under which persons within this state are required to give
evidence in the form of depositions for use in other states." See generally 23 Ill.
L. Rev. 195, 198 (1928).
"McCreight v. State, 45 Ariz. 269, 42 P.2d iio2 (1935); People v. Bromwich, 200
N.Y. 385, 93 N.E. 933 (1911).
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